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Abstract
This paper will examine a model with many agents, each of whom has a different
belief about the dynamics of a risky asset. The agents are Bayesian and so learn
about the asset over time. All agents are assumed to have a finite (but random)
lifetime. When an agent dies, he passes his wealth (but not his knowledge) onto his
heir. As a result, the agents never become sure of the dynamics of the risky asset.
We derive expressions for the stock price and riskless rate. We then use numerical
examples to exhibit their behaviour.
1 Introduction
This paper will look at a model of agents with heterogeneous beliefs. We assume
that there is a single risky asset that produces a dividend process. Agents are
unsure of the dynamics of the dividend process. Specifically, they do not know one
of the parameters that governs its dynamics. Agents therefore form beliefs about
this parameter and update these over time. To avoid agents eventually determining
the true value of the parameter, we assume that agents are finite lived.
The paper will build on previous work of Brown & Rogers (2009). That paper
explained the general theory of how to incorporate heterogeneous beliefs into a dy-
namic equilibrium model. However, in the case in which the agents were Bayesian,
it was seen that the agents would eventually determine the true drift of the divi-
dend process. The purpose of this paper is therefore to investigate a model in which
there is a non-trivial steady state. This is done through the assumption that the
different agents are in fact dynasties. Each member of the dynasty has a finite but
random lifetime and when that member dies, he will pass on his wealth, but not
his knowledge, to his heir. The paper will explain how to construct and solve this
model and will lead to a stationary distribution for the stock price.
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As in Brown & Rogers (2009), we assume that there is a single risky asset which
pays a dividend continuously in time. In addition there is a riskless asset in zero net
supply. The dividend process of the stock is now assumed to be a quadratic function
of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process. All the agents know all the parameters of
the OU process except the mean to which it reverts. All the agents observe the OU
process as it evolves and so as time progresses they update their beliefs about the
unknown parameter. However, since they are finite lived, they will never find its
true value.
The model described is quite simple, yet already there is enough to make the
asset pricing non-trivial. Just as in Brown & Rogers (2009), the agents maximise
their expected utilities subject to their budget constraints and we use these optimi-
sation problems to derive a state price density. Using this state price density we can
then price the risky asset as the net present value of future dividends. Comparative
statics allow us to see how the stock price depends on the parameters of our model.
We also produce a volatility surface for the stock, which behaves very reasonably.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We give a brief literature review below.
Section 2 introduces the model and solves the equilibrium to determine a state price
density. Section 3 then uses this state price density to calculate the prices of the
stock and bond; these calculations are non-trivial. Section 4 looks at comparative
statics of the model and section 5 concludes.
1.1 Literature Review
There is a large literature on heterogeneous beliefs, which has been discussed in
detail in Brown & Rogers (2009). Work includes Kurz (2008b), Kurz (1994), Kurz
(1997), Kurz & Motolese (2006), Kurz (2008a), Kurz et al. (2005), Fan (2006),
Harrison & Kreps (1978), Morris (1996), Wu & Guo (2003), Wu & Guo (2004),
Harris & Raviv (1993), Kandel & Pearson (1995), Buraschi & Jiltsov (2006), Jouini & Napp
(2007). Closer to the work presented here are the papers that assume that there is
a parameter of the economy that is unknown to the agents. We briefly review such
models here.
Basak (2000) considers a two-agent model in which each agent receives an en-
dowment process. There is also an extraneous process that agents believe may
effect the economy. The endowment process and all its parameters are observed.
The extraneous process is observed, but the parameters of the stochastic differen-
tial equation (SDE) that drives it are not known to the agents. They form beliefs
about the drift term in this SDE and update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner.
The paper analyses this problem and derives quantities such as the consumption,
the state price density and riskless rate. Basak also explains how to generalise the
model to multiple agents and multiple extraneous processes.
Basak (2005) also considers a model with two agents, who each receive an en-
dowment process. The aggregate endowment process is observed by the agents.
They also observe its volatility, but not its drift; they use filtering to determine
this drift. There is assumed to be a bond and risky security, both in zero net
supply. Again, agents do not know the drift of the stock price. Agents maximise
the expected utility of consumption. He then solves for the equilibrium and uses
it to derive interest rates and perceived market risk of the agents. He also gives
a number of generalisations to the model. For example, he considers the case in
which there is a process which does not directly affect the asset prices. However,
2
each agent thinks that this process does affect the dynamics of the asset prices and
so this changes the equilibrium. He also looks at the case of multiple agents and
again derives the riskless rate and perceived market prices of risk. The final part
of his paper looks at further extensions to his model; for example, he explores a
monetary model in which there is a money supply that is stochastic and agents
disagree on its drift.
Gallmeyer & Hollifield (2008) have considered the effects of adding a short-sale
constraint to a model with heterogeneous beliefs. They consider a model with
two agents. These agents are unsure about the drift of the output process of the
economy. They start with initial beliefs about the drift and use filtering to update
these. The agent who is initially more pessimistic is assumed to have logarithmic
utility and a short sale constraint. The optimistic agent is assumed to have general
CRRA utility and does not have a short sale constraint. The authors examine
this model and derive expressions for the state price densities, stock price and
consumption. In particular, they examine the effects of the imposition of the short
sale constraint on the stock price.
The paper of Zapatero (1998) considers a model in which there is an aggregate
endowment process that obeys an SDE driven by two independent Brownian mo-
tions. The constant drift of the process is unknown to the agents. There are 2
groups of agents and they each have a different Gaussian prior for this drift. Zap-
atero also considers the case in which as well as observing the endowment process,
the agents also see a signal, which again is driven by the two Brownian motions,
but has unknown drift. Again, agents have prior beliefs about this drift, which they
update. He derives an equilibrium and shows that volatility of the interest rate is
higher in an economy with the additional information source.
Li (2007) considers a model with 2 groups of agents. There is a dividend process
which obeys some SDE, but the drift of this SDE is unknown. The drift can satisfy
one of two different SDEs. Each group of agents attaches a different probability
to the drift obeying the two different SDEs. They update this probability as they
observe more data. Agents are assumed to have log utility and Li derives the
stock price, wealth and consumption of agents in this model. He also analyses the
volatility of the stock price.
Turning to the Bayesian learning side of our story, we remark that there is
an extensive literature on Bayesian learning in finance and economics in which
agents update their beliefs as they observe data. Work includes Hautsch & Hess
(2004), Kandel & Pearson (1995), Schinkel et al. (2002), Kalai & Lehrer (1993)
each of whom uses this Bayesian learning in quite different setups. For exam-
ple, Schinkel et al. (2002) apply Bayesian learning to n competitive firms who set
prices but do not know the demand function. They observe demand at each step
and use this to update their posterior belief for the state of the world, which then
impacts their perceived demand function. The authors show that prices converge.
Kalai & Lehrer (1993) applies Bayesian learning to an n-person game in which
agents do not know the payoff matrices of their competitors. They show that the
equilibrium will approach the Nash equilibrium of the system. Hautsch & Hess
(2004) apply Bayesian learning to explain why more precise data has a larger im-
pact on market prices. They test this by looking at the behaviour of T-bond futures
when unemployment data is announced.
Closer to our work, Guidolin & Timmermann (2001) look at a discrete time
model in which the dividend process can have one of two different growth rates over
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each time period and the probability of each growth rate is unknown to the agents.
The agents are learning, so update their estimate for the unknown probability
at each time step. In order to avoid the problem of agents discovering the true
probability, they also consider agents who only look at a rolling window of data.
2 The Model
The setup of our model is similar to Brown & Rogers (2009). There is a single
productive asset, which we refer to as the stock, which pays dividends continuously
in time. The dividend at time t is δt. The dividend process is assumed to be a
quadratic function of a stationary Ornstein Uhlenbeck (OU) process.
Since we are interested in obtaining a stationary distribution for the stock
price, the construction of the probability space requires slightly more care than
in Brown & Rogers (2009). Let Ω denote the sample space. We set Ω = C(R,R),
the space of continuous functions from R to R. Let Xt(ω) ≡ ω(t) denote the
canonical process. Furthermore, let Ft = σ(Xs : −∞ ≤ s ≤ t).
As before, the reference measure is denoted by P0. We assume that under this
measureX is a stationary OU1 process which reverts to mean zero and has reversion
rate λ.
Next, we define:
Wt = Xt −X0 +
∫ t
0
λXsds (2.1)
for all t ∈ R. Since X is an OU process, we observe that the process (Wt)t≥0 is a
standard Brownian motion2.
2.1 The dividend process
We now define the dividend process by:
δt = a0 + a1Xt + a2X
2
t
for some constants a0, a1, a2.
The simplest non-trivial setup is that in which a0 = a2 = 0, in which case the
dividend process will simply be an OU process. However, choosing such values of
a0 and a2 means that there is a positive probability that the dividend process will
become negative, which is unrealistic. To overcome this problem, the constants can
be chosen so that a0 ≥ a21/4a2, in which case the dividend process will always be
non-negative. Furthermore, it will transpire that considering the case in which the
dividend process is a quadratic function of X is no more difficult than the case in
which δ is simply a scaling of X.3
1An Ornstein Uhlenbeck process which reverts to mean a′ with reversion rate λ satisfies the SDE
dXt = dW˜t − λ(a′ −Xt)dt where W˜ is a standard Brownian motion under the reference measure.
2It will transpire that we are only interested in the increments of W ; thus it does not matter that W0
is known before time 0.
3The case in which δ is a quadratic function of X is slightly more complicated, since two different
values of X can give the same value of δ. Hence, σ(Xs : t0 ≤ s ≤ t) 6= σ(δs : t0 ≤ s ≤ t). Thus, we must
assume that the agents observe the process X , rather than just observing the process δ.
4
2.2 The Agents
In our model there are N agents at all times. We assume that each person has a
random lifetime. When this person dies, their wealth is immediately passed onto
their (ignorant) child. Thus we are viewing each agent as a dynasty rather than a
person4.
Formally, there exist times (T ik)k∈Z which are the jump times of a stationary
renewal process. At each of these times T ik, agent i will die and be replaced by
his child. Thus, the wealth of the agent will be maintained, but their beliefs will
not; the child will start with his own ignorant beliefs which will not depend on any
historical data.
Turning now to the beliefs of the agents, first recall that, under the reference
measure, (Xt)t∈R is an OU process with zero mean. However, under the true
measure, X will revert to level a, which will not necessarily be zero. The agents do
not know this level. They will use Bayesian updating to deduce it.
We need to determine the measure that each agent works under. First note that
if we restrict to the time interval [s, t], we may define a new measure by:
dPa
dP0
= exp
(
λa(Wt −Ws)− 1
2
(λa)2(t− s)
)
(2.2)
It follows from the Cameron-Martin-Girsanov theorem5 that a standard Brownian
motion under P0 becomes a Brownian motion with drift λa under Pa. Formally,
Wr = W¯r + λar, for s ≤ r ≤ t where W¯ is a standard Brownian motion under Pa.
Thus,
dXt = dW¯t + λ(a−Xt)dt
so we see that, under Pa, X is an OU process which reverts to mean a.
Since agents do not know a, the beliefs of each agent simply consist of their
distribution function for the parameter a. When a member of the ith dynasty
is born, he gives λa a prior distribution6. We make the reasonable modelling
assumption that this child’s prior for λa is Normal with mean αi and precision
7 8 ǫ.
The agent then updates his prior according to his observation of (Xs)ti
k
≤s≤t, where
tik denotes the time of birth of the current child and t is the current time.
If the agent knew the value of a, he would simply use a change of measure of the
form (2.2). However, a is unknown, so the agent must weight each of the changes
of measure according to his prior distribution for a. Hence at time t, agent i’s law
4This idea of dynasties has been used by Nakata (2007), who considers an economy in which at
any time point there are H young and H old agents. Each agent lives for 2 periods. Young agent
h ∈ {1, ..., H} has the same preferences and beliefs as the old agent h. He then considers a Rational
Beliefs Equilibrium as explained by Kurz. However, all agents in his model live for exactly two units of
time, in contrast to our assumptions.
5See Rogers & Williams (2000), IV.38 for an account
6This is equivalent to having a prior distribution for a, since λ is known.
7Equivalently, the prior has variance ǫ−1
8Hence, all members of dynasty i begin life with the same prior
5
for the path has density with respect to the reference measure given by:
Λit =
∫ ∞
−∞
√
ǫ
2π
exp
(
− ǫ
2
(λa− αi)2 + λa(Wt −Wti
k
)− 1
2
(λa)2(t− tik)
)
d(λa)
=
√
ǫ
ǫ+∆t
exp
(
(∆W )2 + 2αiǫ∆W − ǫ(αi)2∆t
2(ǫ+∆t)
)
(2.3)
where ∆t and ∆W are given by:
∆t ≡ t− tik ∆W ≡Wt −Wti
k
α ≡ λa (2.4)
2.3 Deriving the State Price Density
Associated with agent (or dynasty) i is a utility function, which we take to be
CARA: Ui(t, x) = − 1γi e−γixe−ρt. Here, ρ is the discount factor, assumed to be the
same for all agents. The agents seek to maximise the expected discounted utility
of their consumption. Thus, agent i’s objective is:
max E0
[ ∫ ∞
t0
Ui(t, c
i
t)Λ
i
t
]
(2.5)
where t0 is some start value, which we will later allow to go to −∞. Λit is the
density derived in (2.3), which jumps at each of the times T ik.
The objectives of the agents have the same form as the previous Brown & Rogers
(2009), so its theory can be used to derive a state price density. In particular, by
looking at the price of an arbitrary contingent claim we can deduce that:
ζsνi = U
′
i(s, c
i
s)Λ
i
s
where νi is some Ft0 random variable9 10. Recalling our expression for Ui and
taking logs, we obtain:
log ζt
γi
+
log νi
γi
= −ρt
γi
− cit +
log Λit
γi
(2.6)
Summing (2.6) over i and using market clearing gives:
log ζt
1
N
∑ 1
γi
+
1
N
∑ log νi
γi
= − 1
N
∑ ρt
γi
− δt
N
+
1
N
∑ log Λit
γi
2.4 A continuum of agents
Recall that there are N different agents in our model. We will now let N tend to
infinity so that we can examine the case in which there is a continuum of agents.
We assume that 1N
∑ 1
γi
has a finite limit and denote this limit by:
Γ−1 ≡ lim
N
1
N
∑ 1
γi
9We will shortly let t0 tend to negative infinity and when this occurs, the Ft0 will be trivial, thus νi
will just be a constant
10 U ′ denotes the derivative of U with respect to its second argument
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Abusing notation slightly, we use ai to denote the limN→∞
ai
N . Hence:
log ζt +G
′ = −ρt− Γ(a1Xt + a2X2t ) + Γ lim
N→∞
∑ 1
Nγi
log Λit (2.7)
where G′ is some Ft0-measurable function. We now let t0 tend to negative infinity;
Ft0 then becomes trivial, so G′ becomes a simple constant11.
Only the last term in (2.7) requires further development. Writing ui for the
time since the the last person died in the ith dynasty, we obtain:
Γ lim
N→∞
∑ 1
Nγi
log Λit = Γ lim
N→∞
∑ 1
Nγi
[1
2
log
( ǫ
ǫ+ ui
)
+
((Wt −Wt−ui)2 + 2αiǫ(Wt −Wt−ui)− ǫ(αi)2ui
2(ǫ+ ui)
)]
(2.8)
We assume that the mean of αi is given by 〈α〉 and further that the distribution
of ui, αi and γi are all independent. We further make the assumption that u has a
density ϕ(·), given by:
ϕ(u) = A(ǫ+ u)λe−λu
where A = λ1+ǫλ is chosen so that
∫∞
0 ϕ(u)du = 1. Since ϕ(u) represents the
probability of someone who is currently alive having age u, it follows that ϕ(·)
must be decreasing. This gives the inequality λǫ ≥ 1.
Using our expression for ϕ, equation (2.8) becomes:
log ζt = −G− Γ(a1Xt + a2X2t )− ρt+
1
2
∫ (
Wt −Wt−u
)2
ǫ+ u
ϕ(u)du
+ 〈α〉ǫ
∫ (
Wt −Wt−u
)
ǫ+ u
ϕ(u)du
where G is some new constant. This then gives us:
log ζt = −G− Γ(a1Xt + a2X2t )− ρt+
A
2
ηt + 〈α〉ǫAξt
where
ξt =
∫ ∞
0
(Wt −Wt−u)λe−λudu
ηt =
∫ ∞
0
(Wt −Wt−u)2λe−λudu
By rearrangement and use of Fubini (see appendix), we are able to show that:
ξt = Xt
ηt = X
2
t + e
−λt
∫ t
−∞
λeλsX2s ds
11We note that as t0 →∞, the expression on the right of (2.7) is almost surely finite, so the left hand
side must be as well. Since our ζ and (νi)1≤i≤N were only chosen up to a multiplicative constant, we
may choose them to depend on t0 in such a way that as t0 →∞ both ζ and G′ are a.s. finite.
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Our final expression for the state price density is then given by:
log ζt = −G− Γ(a1Xt + a2X2t )− ρt+
A
2
[(Xt)
2 + e−λt
∫ t
−∞
λeλsX2s ds] + 〈α〉ǫAXt
(2.9)
= −G+BXt + CX2t + Ut − ρt (2.10)
where:
B = 〈α〉ǫA− Γa1 C = A
2
− Γa2
and
Ut =
1
2
Ae−λt
∫ t
−∞
λeλsX2sds
3 Asset Prices
3.1 The Interest Rate Process
We will use our state price density to derive the interest rate process. From Itoˆ’s
formula, we have:
dζt
ζt
= (B + 2CXt)dWt
+
(
C +
λA
2
X2t − λUt − ρ−BλXt − 2λCX2t +
1
2
(B + 2CXt)
2
)
dt
=˙
[
(−ρ+ C + 1
2
B2) + (−λB + 2CB)Xt + (−2λC + λA
2
+ 2C2)X2t − λUt
]
dt
where the symbol =˙ signifies that the two sides differ by a local martingale. The
interest rate is equal to minus the coefficient of dt in the above expansion, hence:
rt = r(Xt, Ut) ≡ (ρ− C − 1
2
B2) +B(λ− 2C)Xt + (2λC − λA
2
− 2C2)X2t + λUt
(3.1)
Thus, our model gives us an interest rate process of the form:
rt = α0 + α1Xt + α2X
2
t + λUt
for some constants αi, i = 0, 1, 2. Note that the interest rate process will depend on
the behaviour of the dividend process in the past (via Ut) as well as on the current
value of the dividend process. We therefore see that in some sense, high historical
volatility generates high values of the riskless rate.
3.2 The Stock Price
We will now calculate the stock price. We have:
St = E
0
t
[ ∫ ∞
t
ζuδu
ζt
du
]
=
1
ζt
∫ ∞
t
E
0
t
[
ζuδu
]
du (3.2)
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3.2.1 A PDE for the stock price
From the form of ζt and the Markovian structure, we will have that:
ζtSt = ζth(Xt, Ut) (3.3)
for some function h. This function will satisfy a PDE which we may determine by
by observing that ζtSt+
∫ t
0 ζsδsds is a martingale and applying Itoˆ’s formula. After
a few calculations, we obtain the PDE:
0 =
1
2
hxx + (B + (2C − λ)x)hx + λ(A
2
x2 − u)hu − r(x, u)h+ (a0 + a1x+ a2x2)
(3.4)
Unfortunately, it does not appear to be possible to solve this equation in closed
form, so we will resort to another approach. However, before we do this, let us look
at some of the consequences of (3.3) and (3.4). Suppose that under the real-world
probability, P∗, the OU process reverts to level a
∗, then we have that:
dSt = hxdW
∗
t + hxλ(a
∗ −Xt)dt+ hu(λA
2
X2t − λUt)dt+
1
2
hxxdt
where W ∗ denotes a Brownian motion under measure P∗. After using (3.4) we get
that:
dSt = hxdW
∗
t + hx
(
(λa∗ −B)− 2CXt
)
dt+ r(Xt, Ut)hdt− (a0 + a1Xt + a2X2t )dt
Hence, we see that the volatility and drift of the stock price are given by:
Σt =
hx(Xt, Ut)
h(Xt, Ut)
(3.5)
µ∗t =
r(Xt, Ut)h(Xt, Ut)− (a0 + a1Xt + a2X2t ) +
(
λa∗ − 2CXt −B
)
hx(Xt, Ut)
h(Xt, Ut)
(3.6)
We shall use these expressions later.
3.2.2 Calculation of stock price via computation of conditional ex-
pectation
We will now proceed to determine the stock price via another method. Substituting
the state price density from (2.10) into (3.2), we obtain:
St = exp{−BXt − CX2t − Ut + ρt}∫ ∞
t
E
0
t
[
(a0 + a1XT + a2X
2
T ) exp{BXT +CX2T + UT − ρT}
]
dT
On first sight it may appear that it is very difficult to get any further with this
expression. However, if we can calculate:
V T (t,Xt; θ) := E
0
t
[
exp{θ(a0 + a1XT + a2X2T ) +BXT + CX2T +
∫ T
t
A
2
λeλ(s−T )X2s ds}
]
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then we may differentiate with respect to θ to and set θ = 0 to give:
St = exp{−BXt − CX2t }
∫ ∞
t
exp{(e−λ(T−t) − 1)Ut − ρ(T − t)} ∂
∂θ
|θ=0V T (t,Xt; θ)dT
We also define τ ≡ T − t. We will show that:
V T (t,Xt; θ) = exp{1
2
a(τ)X2t + b(τ)Xt + c(τ)}
where a, b and c are functions which we will shortly deduce. To deduce these
functions, we will use a martingale argument. For t ≤ T we define:
MTt ≡ E0t
[
exp{θ(a0 + a1XT + a2X2T ) +BXT + CX2T +
∫ T
−∞
A
2
λeλ(s−T )X2s ds}
]
= V T (t,Xt; θ) exp{
∫ t
−∞
A
2
λeλ(s−T )X2s ds}
Now apply Itoˆ’s formula:
dMTt = exp{
∫ t
−∞
A
2
λeλ(s−T )X2s ds}
[
Vtdt+ VxdXt +
1
2
VxxdXtdXt +
λA
2
eλ(t−T )X2t V dt
]
=MTt
[λA
2
eλ(t−T )X2t dt− (
1
2
a˙(τ)X2t + b˙(τ)Xt + c˙(τ))dt
+ (a(τ)Xt + b(τ))(dWt − λXtdt) + 1
2
(a(τ) + (a(τ)Xt + b(τ))
2)dt
]
But (MTt )t≤T is a martingale under P0, so the coefficient of dt in the above expres-
sion must be zero. Thus we obtain:
1
2
a˙ =
λA
2
e−λτ − λa+ 1
2
a2
b˙ = ab− λb
c˙ =
1
2
(a+ b2)
The boundary conditions are given by:
a(0) = 2(C + θa2) b(0) = B + θa1 c(0) = θa0
3.2.3 Solving the ODEs
We now solve the ODEs. The first equation is a Riccati equation, so in order to
solve we make the usual substitution:
a(τ) = − g˙(τ)
g(τ)
Substituting this into the ODE for a gives:
1
2
g¨ + λg˙ +
λA
2
e−λτg = 0
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and the boundary condition becomes:
−g˙(0) = 2(C + θa2)g(0)
We can solve this equation using Maple to obtain:
g(u) = e−λu
[(√
λAY1(2
√
A/λ)− 2(C + θa2)Y2(2
√
A/λ)
)
J2(2e
−λu/2
√
A/λ)
− (√λAJ1(2√A/λ)− 2(C + θa2)J2(2√A/λ))Y2(2e−λu/2√A/λ)
]
where Ji and Yi are Bessel functions of order i of the first and second kind respec-
tively. Turning now to the ODE for b, we may use our solution for a to deduce:
b˙+
g˙
g
b+ λb = 0
Rearranging gives:
d
dτ
(bgeλτ ) = 0
which we can solve subject to b(0) = B + θa1 to give:
b(τ) =
(B + θa1)g(0)
eλτg(τ)
Finally, we obtain:
c(τ) = θa0 +
∫ τ
0
1
2
(a(τ ′) + b(τ ′)2)dτ ′
Thus we have completely solved the ODEs. In order to calculate the stock price,
we need to find ∂V∂θ . We therefore need:
∂g
∂θ
= e−λu
[− 2a2Y2(2√A/λ)J2(2e−λu/2√A/λ) + 2a2J2(2√A/λ)Y2(2e−λu/2√A/λ)]
and also:
∂g˙
∂θ
= −λ∂g
∂θ
+e−λu
[−2a2Y2(2√A/λ)(λJ2(2√A/λe−λu/2)−√Aλe−λu/2J1(2√A/λe−λu/2))
+ 2a2J2(2
√
A/λ)
(
λY2(2
√
A/λe−λu/2)−
√
Aλe−λu/2Y1(2
√
A/λe−λu/2)
)]
We may then calculate expressions for ∂V∂θ . First note that:
∂V
∂θ
=
(1
2
∂a
∂θ
X2t +
∂b
∂θ
Xt +
∂c
∂θ
)
exp{1
2
a(τ)X2t + b(τ)Xt + c(τ)}
But:
∂c
∂θ
(τ) = a0 +
∫ τ
0
1
2
(∂a
∂θ
(τ ′) + 2b(τ ′)
∂b
∂θ
(τ ′)
)
dτ ′
∂b
∂θ
(τ) = a1
g(0)
eλτg(τ)
+
(B + θa1)
eλτ
∂g
∂θ (0)
g(τ)
− (B + θa1)
eλτ
g(0)
g(τ)2
∂g
∂θ
(τ)
∂a
∂θ
(τ) = −
∂g˙
∂θ (τ)
g(τ)
+
˙g(τ)
g(τ)2
∂g
∂θ
(τ)
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So finally we have:
St = exp{−BXt − CX2t }
∫ ∞
0
exp{−ρτ − (1− e−λτ )Ut}
(1
2
∂a
∂θ
X2t +
∂b
∂θ
Xt +
∂c
∂θ
)
exp{1
2
a(τ)X2t + b(τ)Xt + c(τ)}dτ (3.7)
This is as far as we can get with the expression for the stock price. We see that
the stock price depends not only on the dividend at time t, but also on Ut, a term
reflecting the behaviour of (Xs)−∞≤s≤t. This is as we would expect, since agents
need to use information from the whole of their lifetimes to make better estimates
of the mean to which X is reverting. From properties of the OU process, we see
that if Xt reverts to mean a then, since X is stationary, we have Xt ∼ N(a, 12λ).
Hence,
EUt =
∫ t
−∞
λA
2
eλ(r−t)
( 1
2λ
+ a2
)
dr =
A
2
( 1
2λ
+ a2
)
This indicates a sensible value for Ut, which will be helpful for when we begin to
look at numerical examples later on.
3.3 The Bond Price
The time-t price of a zero-coupon bond which has unit payoff at time T is given by:
E
0
[ζT
ζt
|Ft
]
= exp
[
−BXt −CX2t − Ut(1− e−λτ )− ρτ
]
V T (t,Xt; θ = 0)
Using our expression for V T (t,Xt; θ = 0), we obtain:
exp
[
(
1
2
a(τ) − C)X2t + (b(τ) − B)Xt + c(τ) − ρτ − (1 − e−λτ )Ut
]
(3.8)
where the functions a, b and c are all evaluated using θ = 0.
3.4 Remarks on the case in which a is known
Note that if we let ǫ→∞, then this corresponds to the case in which all the agents
are certain that they know the value of a. By taking the limit in our expressions for
the stock price, bond price and riskless rate, we can deduce expressions for these
quantities in this limit. We note further that if the agents are sure about the value
of a and this value corresponds to the true value, a∗, then the expressions we obtain
will be the same as those for the model in which the true value of a was known to
all the agents.
4 Numerical Results
4.1 Calibrating the model
We now investigate the qualitative behaviour of the stock price as we vary the
parameters in our model. To do this it is important that we choose a suitable
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region over which the parameters can vary. We will restrict to the case in which
a0 = a1 = 0, so that we have simply δt = a2X
2
t . This ensures that the dividend
process remains positive. Note further that the state price density (2.10) only
depends on the product Γa2 rather than the individual Γ and a2. Although the
dividend process does depend on a2, changing a2 simply corresponds to the changing
the units in which we measure the dividend process. Hence, we may choose a2 = 1.
Some of the parameters are relatively easy to choose, such as λ and ρ, for which
we choose λ = 2 and ρ = 0.04. However, other parameters, such as Γ are much
harder to determine. We are only interested in ensuring that the parameters are
of the correct order. In order to do this, we will begin by assuming that 〈α〉 = a.
Furthermore, for the purposes of calibration, we will consider the limit as ǫ → ∞,
which corresponds to the case in which agents are sure that they know the true
value of a. This leaves the parameters a and Γ which we still need to determine.
One way to determine these parameters would be to choose them in order to
match various moments from empirical data, such as the mean price-dividend ratio;
this was the strategy employed in Brown & Rogers (2009) when we considered
the equity premium puzzle. Ideally, we would use the same method here, but
unfortunately our stock price is much more complicated. Thus, computing a given
stock price requires the numerical computation of an integral. To work out the
mean price dividend ratio, we would then need to compute a further integral as
we averaged over the values of the driving Brownian motion. We would then vary
the parameters and calculate the expected price dividend ratio each time in an
attempt to find a realistic set of parameters. Given the additional complexity of
this problem and the fact that we are only interested in determining parameters
that are of the correct order, we will proceed in a different manner.
We first note that the interest rate process has a particularly simple form, which
we can use to get a simple expression for the expected riskless rate. We can match
this with the mean riskless rate from the Shiller data set.
Note that we are considering the case in which a0 = a1 = 0, a2 = 1 and the limit
as ǫ→∞ and hence Aǫ→ 1, B → 〈α〉 = a,C → −Γ. Substituting into expression
(3.1) gives:
r = (ρ+ Γ− 12a2) + a(λ+ 2Γ)Xt − 2Γ(λ+ Γ)X2t
Thus, the expected riskless rate is given by:
Er = (ρ+ Γ− 12a2) + a2(λ+ 2Γ)− 2Γ(λ+ Γ)(a2 + 12λ )
To determine Γ, we compare a CRRA agent (where we know a reasonable value
for the constant of relative risk aversion) with a CARA agent. If we consider a
single agent model in which the value of a is known, the stock price will be given
by:
S0 = E
∫ ∞
0
U ′(δt)
U ′(δ0)
δtdt
Since we just want our parameters to be of the correct order, it is sufficient to check
that the behaviour of
U ′(δt)
U ′(δ0)
δt (4.1)
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in the neighbourhood of X = a is the same for both the CRRA and CARA case.
If we set X0 = Xt = a then clearly (4.1) will be the same in both the CRRA and
CARA case. We therefore impose the requirement that a small change in Xt from
Xt = a has the same effect in both cases, leading to the condition:
U ′′CRRA(a
2)
U ′CRRA(a
2)
=
U ′′CARA(a
2)
U ′CARA(a
2)
Which leads us to the condition:
Γ =
R
a2
(4.2)
Since we know a sensible value for R is R = 2, this equation gives us an equation
from which we can determine Γ and a. Substituting in our expression for the riskless
rate yields the cubic equation:
l(Γ) ≡ Γ
3
λ
+ 2RΓ2 + (Er − ρ+ 2R(λ− 1))Γ + 12R−Rλ = 0
We will choose R = 2. We also choose Er = 0.01, as given by the Shiller data set.
We may then note that l(0) < 0 and dldΓ > 0 for Γ > 0, hence there is a unique
positive solution to the above equation, which we can easily compute. Computation
shows that the correct Γ to choose is Γ = 0.49 which we take as our default value.
This gives a=2.01.
To summarise, the default parameters we choose are: a0 = a1 = 0; a2 = 1;λ =
2; ρ = 0.04; ǫ = 1.0; Γ = 0.49; 〈α〉 = a = 2.01. We also choose Xt = a, Ut =
A
2
(a2 + 12λ). We then vary the parameters and examine the behaviour.
4.2 Comments on Results
Figure 1 shows that the stock price is decreasing in λ. Recall that λ is the parameter
which tells us how quickly the dividend process returns to its mean. Hence, a lower
value of λ means that the dividend process is more likely to reach high values, so
is worth more to the agents. However, λ is also a parameter used in specifying
the distribution of the lifetime of the agents. Increasing λ therefore decreases the
expected lifetime of the agents. Each child in the dynasty therefore has less time
to learn about the unknown parameter a and this increased uncertainty amongst
the agents also means that the stock price decreases as λ increases.
Figure 2 shows that as ǫ increases, so does the stock price, which is to be
expected since if the agents know more about the dividend process (i.e. their
beliefs have a higher precision), the stock should be worth more to them. Similarly,
Figure 3 shows that the larger the value of ρ, the less the stock is worth. A large
ρ indicates that the agents are impatient and want to consume their wealth in the
near future, making the stock less attractive.
Figure 4 exhibits the dependence of the stock price on 〈α〉. Recall that Xt and
Ut are kept fixed as we vary 〈α〉. A small 〈α〉 indicates that the agents think the
level to which X reverts is low. Thus, since we do not change Xt, a low value of 〈α〉
relative to X indicates that X is currently abnormally high and so the dividends
are abnormally high. Thus, the agents are keen to hold this stock. Furthermore,
the relatively high level of X means that the agents have a large amount of dividend
with which to buy the stock.
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Figure 5 may at first seem surprising, since it shows that the stock price is
increasing in the risk aversion, Γ. However, we recall that all agents have a CARA
utility and furthermore, the parameters of our model are chosen so that the dividend
process is non-negative. On the one hand, a larger value of Γ means that the value
of the dividend process becoming larger are valued more highly than before. The
downside of holding the stock is limited, since the dividend process is always non-
negative. This explains the behaviour shown in 5.
The volatility surface12 in Figure 6 shows that the volatility appears to be
increasing in both Xt and Ut. This seems reasonable: if the dividend process has
been varying greatly in the past, then Ut will be large, and in this case we would
expect the stock to have a larger volatility. Also, if Xt is small and Ut is large,
it means that either the dividend has been varying greatly, or the value of Xt
is abnormally small, so in these cases a large volatility should not be surprising.
However, increasing Xt means that Ut no longer implies that the dividend process
has been varying so much - it just tells us that Xt is typically large. This explains
why increasing Xt will decrease the volatility.
5 Conclusions
We have introduced a new model in which the dividend of the stock obeys an OU
process for which none of the agents know the mean. We derived a state price
density and were able to use this to price the stock and a bond. We also were
able to deduce an interest rate model. We produced graphs which illustrated the
dependence of the stock price on the various parameters. The behaviour shown
in these graphs seemed very reasonable. We also looked at how the parameter
certainty case could be viewed as a special limit of the parameter uncertainty case.
Extensions to this work include using a different utility function for the agents;
a CRRA utility would be a natural choice. In section 2.4 we also had to assume a
quite specific form for the distribution of the lifetimes of the agents. An obvious
improvement would be to consider the problem with a different distribution of
lifetimes, in particular one that did not depend on the parameters of the dividend
process. Unfortunately both these generalisations appear to make the calculations
intractable.
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APPENDIX
A Stochastic Integrals
A.1 Calculating ξt
Recall that ξt is given by:
ξt =
∫ ∞
0
(Wt −Wt−u)λe−λudu
By change of variables,
ξt =Wt − e−λt
∫ t
−∞
λeλsWsds
So substituting from (2.1) gives:
ξt =Wt +X0 − e−λt
[ ∫ t
−∞
Xsλe
λsds+
∫ t
−∞
λeλs
∫ s
0
λXrdrds
]
(A.1)
But the final term in the above expression is:
− e−λt
∫ t
−∞
λeλs
∫ s
0
λXrdrds
= e−λt
∫ 0
s=−∞
∫ 0
r=s
λeλsλXrdrds− e−λt
∫ t
s=0
∫ s
r=0
λeλsλXrdrds
Applying Fubini, we obtain:
e−λt
∫ 0
r=−∞
∫ r
s=−∞
λeλsλXrdsdr − e−λt
∫ t
r=0
∫ t
s=r
λeλsλXrdsdr
Computing the integral with respect to s gives:
e−λt
[ ∫ 0
−∞
λeλrXrdr − eλt
∫ t
0
Xrλdr +
∫ t
0
λeλrXrdr
]
= eλt
∫ t
−∞
λeλrXrdr −
∫ t
0
λXrdr
Substituting this into (A.1) gives:
ξt =Wt +X0 −
∫ t
0
λXrdr
But recalling (2.1), we obtain:
ξt = Xt
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A.2 Calculating ηt
Recall that ηt is given by:
ηt =
∫ ∞
0
(Wt −Wt−u)2λe−λudu
Changing variables we obtain:
ηt = e
−λt
∫ t
−∞
(Wt −Wr)2λeλrdr
Substituting from (2.1) gives:
ηt = e
−λt
∫ t
−∞
[
(Xt −Xr) +
∫ t
r
λXsds
]2
λeλrdr
= e−λt
∫ t
−∞
(Xt −Xr)2λeλrdr + 2e−λt
∫ t
−∞
(Xt −Xr)
( ∫ t
r
λXsds
)
λeλrdr
+ e−λt
∫ t
−∞
( ∫ t
r
λXsds
)2
λeλrdr (A.2)
We will now apply Fubini to two of these terms to deduce an expression for ηt.
Firstly, we work on:
∫ t
r=−∞
Xt
∫ t
s=r
λXsdsλe
λrdr
By applying Fubini, we obtain:
∫ t
s=−∞
XtXs
∫ s
r=−∞
λ2eλrdrds
=
∫ t
−∞
XtXsλe
λsds
Putting this into (A.2) gives:
ηt = X
2
t + e
−λt
∫ t
−∞
λeλrX2r dr
− 2e−λt
∫ t
−∞
Xr
( ∫ t
r
λXsds
)
λeλrdr
+ e−λt
∫ t
−∞
∫ t
r
λXsds
∫ t
r
λXvdvλe
λrdr (A.3)
The final term is:
2e−λt
∫ t
r=−∞
∫ t
s=r
∫ t
v=s
λXsλXvλe
λrdvdsdr
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where we have halved the area of integration in the dvds integral. Applying Fubini
yields:
2e−λt
∫ t
s=−∞
∫ t
v=s
∫ s
r=−∞
λXsλXvλe
λrdrdvds
= 2e−λt
∫ t
s=−∞
∫ t
v=s
λXsλXve
λsdvds
= 2e−λt
∫ t
r=−∞
λXre
λr
∫ t
s=r
λXsdsdr
Substituting this into (A.3) gives:
ηt = X
2
t + e
−λt
∫ t
−∞
λeλsX2s ds
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Figure 1: Graph of St against λ.
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Figure 2: Graph of St against ǫ.
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Figure 3: Graph of St against ρ.
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Figure 4: Graph of St against 〈α〉.
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Figure 5: Graph of St against Γ.
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Figure 6: Volatility Surface
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